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ARGUMENT 
POINT I AN APPELLATE COURT MUST VIEW THE FACTS MOST 
FAVORABLY TO PLAINTIFF SACHS AS THE PARTY OPPOSING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THUS, DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON PLAINTIFF 
SACHS' CLAIMS, BASED ON DEFENDANTS' ALTERNATIVE 
VERSION OF THE FACTS, MUST BE REJECTED. 
A. Genuinely Disputed Issues Of Material Fact Remain For Trial On Plaintiff 
Sachs' Claims Against Defendants For Declaratory Judgment And Breach Of 
Express Or Implied Contract. 
Defendants Lesser and Loeb and IJPCM dispute virtu.i III all the material factual 
allegations in Plaintiff Sachs' "Statement of Facts" (Aplnt. Br. 4-15). Lesser and Loeb 
begin their "Statement of the Case" by asserting that, "Sachs tried to interject himself into 
the sale of UPCM", L&L Br. I,1 disputing Plaintiff Sachs' evidence that it was Lesser, 
acting on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, who telephoned Sachs on May 17, 2001, and 
requested Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible after receiving 
written notice of the fee Sachs would expect for his services earlier that day. See, Sachs' 
"Statement of Fact", U1J16-22, AP l n t - Br- 1 0"1 2. 
Lesser and Loeb also baldly assert that, "Sachs... now seeks in excess of two 
million dollars for making a few phone calls in which he did nothing more than tell 
Gerald Jackson...something that Jackson and everyone else who follows real estate in 
Park City, already knew," L&L Br. 1-2. This assertion disputes Plaintiff Sachs' evidence 
(1) that Sachs' fee for finding a buyer for UPCM was based on the size of the deal and 
Lesser's and Loeb's brief is referred to as "L&L Br." and UPCM s brief is referred 
to as "UPCM Br." Lesser and Loeb and UPCM are sometimes collectively referred 
herein as "Defendants." Appellant's opening brief is referred to as "Aplnt. Br." 
the result achieved; (2) that the information Sachs conveyed to Jackson concerning 
Lesser's desire for an immediate sale of UPCM because Lesser and Loeb had lost 
confidence in RothwelPs ability to manage UPCM, as imparted to Sachs by Lesser in 
their meeting on May 2, 2001, was not known to Jackson or anyone else at the time Sachs 
initially contacted Jackson to purchase UPCM; (3) that, in addition to soliciting Jackson 
to purchase UPCM, Sachs advised Jackson to obtain a confidentiality agreement from 
UPCM to facilitate his purchase of UPCM, and that (4) pursuant to Lesser5 s instructions 
to refer "any prospective purchasers" to UPCM President Rothwell, Sachs telephoned 
Rothwell and advised him that Jackson was interested in purchasing UPCM based on 
Sachs' solicitation. See, Sachs' "Statement of Facts", ffl| 17-18; 23-37, Aplnt. Br. 13-17. 
Instead of citing record evidence to show that one or more of the facts alleged by 
Plaintiff Sachs is incorrect or unsupported, Lesser, Loeb and UPCM dispute Plaintiff 
Sachs' factual assertions by entirely supplanting Plaintiffs "Statement of Facts " with 
their own, Lesser's and Loeb's consuming 59 paragraphs and UPCM's consuming 46 
paragraphs. See, L&L Br. 4-17; UPCM Br. 4-13.2 Defendants list facts which are 
immaterial to Plaintiffs1 claims and strategically omit many of the critical facts on which 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims are predicated, without explicitly admitting or disputing such 
facts, to give the appearance that the facts on which the district court granted summary 
2
 Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the brief of the 
appellee need not contain a statement of the case, which includes a "statement of the facts 
of the case relevant to the issues presented for review" required under Rule 24(a), "unless 
the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant." 
2 
judgment are "undisputed" when, in fact, they are directly disputed by Defendants. (See, 
L&L Br. 38-44; UPCM Br. 14, 33-46) For example, Plaintiff Sachs asserts that Lesser, 
on behalf of Loeb and I JPCM, telephoned him on May 1 7, 2001, ai id i eqi lested Sach 
find a buyer for UPCM as quickly as possible, after Lesser had received notice of the fee 
Plaintiff Sachs expected for his services in a letter earlier that day. See, Sachs' 
"Statement of Facts", fflf 19-21, Aplnt. Br. 11-12. However, Lesser and Loeb and UPCM 
fail to even mention this critical event. See, "Statement of Facts", ^ 33-35, L&L Br. 9-
11; "Statement of Facts", 1J1123-25, UPCM. Br. 7-8. 
Based on their own versions of the facts, Lesser and Loeb and UPCM argue that 
the district court "correctly determined that no genuinely disputed issues of fact remain 
for trial on Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and for breach of express and 
implied contract" and that Defendants are entitled to judgment on these claims as a matter 
of law. Compare, Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 25-33 with Argument, Point 111, I ,&L 
Br. 38-43 and Argument, Point V, UPCM Br. 38-45. 
1. Breach of Express Contract 
As to Plaintiff Sachs' claim for breach of express contract, Defendants argue that 
there was "no meeting of the minds" on the terms of the contract, L&L Br. 18; UPCM Br. 
39, and that, "Sachs admits that defendants did not assent either verbally or in writing to 
the finder's fee stated in Sachs' letter." L&L Br. 38; UP< M i1 U 1 lefendants fail to 
acknowledge that Sachs disputed this assertion with (1) Lesser's deposition testimony in 
which Lesser agreed that Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee if he had found 
Granite or Jackson to purchase UPCM, but denied that Sachs found Jackson to purchase 
3 
UPCM,3 and (2) Rothwell's fax to Sachs of August 19, 2003, long after the merger, 
claiming that he and Jackson "had discussed UP for years" and "We viewed you as a 
representative of Granite Construction only." See, "Statement of Facts", }^43, Aplnt. Br. 
18; Lesser Dep., Add. 9, R. 1411-1412; 1J49, Aplnt Br. 20 and Aplnt. Add. 10, R. 1452. 
Defendants also fail to mention that Plaintiff Sachs presented sworn testimony that 
Lesser verbally assented to the fee agreement by requesting Plaintiff Sachs to find a 
purchaser for UPCM on May 17, 2001, after having received written notice of the fee 
Plaintiff Sachs would expect for his services. See, "Statement of Facts", ffl| 11-22, Aplnt. 
Br. 8-13; Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-31. 
Plaintiff Sachs also presented sworn testimony that while he and Lesser did not 
discuss the specific amount of a finder's fee Plaintiff Sachs would receive during their 
meeting on May 2, 2001, they had a mutual understanding that Plaintiff Sachs would be 
paid a reasonable and customary fee for his services as indicated by Lesser's comment to 
Sachs during this meeting, that if DRKW, an investment banking firm that was working 
with UPCM, located a purchaser for UPCM, Sachs would not receive the fee. See, 
"Statement of Facts", lfl| 11-12, 14, Aplnt. Br. 8-10. 
Plaintiff Sachs also presented evidence that Lesser and Rothwell acquiesced and 
ratified the finder fee agreement by failing to repudiate the agreement despite numerous 
opportunities to do so, including Lesser's conversation with Sachs on May 17, 2001, and 
the subsequent occasion on which Plaintiff Sachs telephoned Rothwell to tell him that 
3
 Defendants also omit any reference to the substantial evidence Plaintiff Sachs 
presented to dispute Lesser's and UPCM's assertion that Plaintiff Sachs did not locate 
Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, "Statement of Facts", ffif 23-40, 47, Aplnt. Br. 13-20. 
4 
Jackson was interested in purchasing UPCM based on Sachs' solicitation. See, 
"Statement of Facts", fflf 19-22, 28, 50-51, Aplnt. Br. 12-13, 15, 20-21. Plaintiff Sachs 
also presented evidence that ly received fees from UPC fo an 
oral agreement, establishing a course of conduct between the parties. See, "Statement of 
Facts", f2, Aplnt. Br. 6.4 
Defendants next argue that, "Sachs' letters only discuss Granite." L&L Br. 38, 40; 
UPCM Br. 35. Again, Defendants fail to mention that Sachs disputed this assertion with 
his letter of May 18, 2001 to Rothwell and Lesser indicating that, "another investor 
together with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser" and concluding that, "I will 
continue to keep you apprised ol nil phipmuls wkeiln i fin suit* m (oiiit venturing of the 
project", clearly indicating that Sachs is not limiting potential purchasers of UPCM to 
Granite. (Emphasis Supplied) See, "Statement of Facts", 1fl[ 22, Aplnt. Br. 13. 
Defendants also fail to mention Plaintiff Sachs' evidence that prior to delivering 
his letters of May 17-18, 2001 to Rothwell and Lesser, Lesser had exhorted Sachs in their 
initial meeting on May 2, 2001, to find a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM, and "to 
get the job done, whether it's with Granite, or someone else, or a combination", and that 
Lesser directed Sachs to refer "any prospective purchasers" to Rothwell, indicating that 
the identity of the purchaser of UPCM was immaterial to Lesser; that Lesser encouraged 
Plaintiff Sachs to find purchasers other than Granite, and that Lesser was thus well aware 
Contrary to UPCM's assertion that "Plaintiff Sachs has never received a finder's fee 
for the sale of a company," See, Statement of Facts, |^46, UPCM Br. 12, Sachs testified 
that he could not recall all of the instances in which he had received such fees due to the 
passage of time and gave some examples of recent fees. See, Sachs Dep. 20:8-21:16, R. 
748. 
5 
that Sachs was looking for potential purchasers for UPCM other than Granite. See, 
"Statement of Facts", fflf 19, Aplnt. Br. 11-12. 
Additionally, Plaintiff Sachs provided sworn testimony that Lesser did not exclude 
Jackson or anyone else that Sachs might contact as a potential purchaser for UPCM in 
their meeting on May 2, 2001, except to say that if DRKW, the investment banking firm 
working with UPCM found the purchaser, that Sachs would not receive the fee. Thus, 
Lesser clearly left the field of potential purchasers Sachs might contact wide open. See, 
"Statement of Facts", Tf^f 11-14, Aplnt. Br. 8-10. 
Lesser and Loeb also argue that, "Lesser did not tell Sachs to go and find another 
buyer or that Sachs would be paid a finder's fee", L&L Br. 39, again failing to mention 
that Plaintiff Sachs disputes this assertion with sworn testimony and documentary 
evidence that Lesser telephoned him on May 17, 2001, and told Sachs that he wanted him 
to find a purchaser, rather than a joint venturer, for UPCM, and that this conversation 
occurred after Lesser had received Sachs' letter earlier on May 17, 2001, indicating the 
fees Sachs expected for his services. See, Lesser's phone records for May 17, 2001, R. 
1561; "Statement of Facts", ffi[ 16-21, Aplnt. Br. 10-12. 
Lesser's and Loeb's further argument that Sachs' statement in the letter of May 
17, 2001, that he would accept a couple of prime developed lots in UPCM's Project 
which were together valued at approximately $2 million dollars and that this amount is 
approximately 3% of UPCM's purchase price "is nothing other than speculation and 
conjecture", L& L Br. 39; UPCM Br. 39-40, is itself unsupported and contrary to Sachs' 
evidence. Lesser and Loeb fail to cite record evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff Sachs 
6 
ever claimed that he knew the precise purchase price that would eventually be paid for 
UPCM at the time he proposed the lots, valued at approximately $2 million, as a fee for 
his services in locating a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM. Conversely, Plaintiff 
Sachs presented sworn testimony that he arrived at the fee "based on his experience and 
the size of the deal" and the fact that the fee amounted to approximately 3% of the total 
price finally paid for UPCM further demonstrated that such a fee was reasonable. See, 
"Statement of Facts", 1fl7, 42, Aplnt. Br. 11,18. 
Plaintiff Sachs also presented evidence that despite his express request to Lesser 
and Rothwell in his letter of May 17, 2001, to "please let me know if you have any 
question about such a finder's fee," neither Lesser nor Rothwell ever questioned the 
terms of the finder's fee agreement despite numerous opportunities to do so, thus 
indicating that Lesser and Rothwell understood and accepted the terms of the finder fee 
agreement. See, "Statement of Facts", 1ffl 19-21, 28, 50-51, Aplnt. Br. 15, 20-21. 
2. Breach of Implied Contract 
As to Plaintiff Sachs' breach of implied contract claim, Defendants argue that, 
"Sachs did not confer any benefit on Defendants' because "at the time of his initial 
telephone conversation with Sachs, it is undisputed that Jackson already knew UPCM 
was for sale and was working on the purchase" and that "Sachs did not find Jackson." 
(Emphasis supplied). See, L&L Br. 41; UPCM Br. 45-46. Defendants fail to mention that 
Plaintiff Sachs directly disputed this assertion with sworn testimony that he contacted 
Jackson to purchase UPCM and told Jackson of Lesser's desire for an immediate sale of 
UPCM because of Lesser's and Loeb's loss of confidence in Rothwell. Sachs testified 
7 
that during this initial contact, Jackson did not indicate that he was already in a deal with 
Rothwell to purchase UPCM, but expressed immediate enthusiasm for purchasing UPCM 
based on this new information, thanking Sachs and telling him that he would "like to take 
the deal down with some institutional and other investors." See, "Statement of Facts", fflf 
23-24, Aplnt. Br. 13-14. Defendants also fail to note that Sachs disputed their assertion 
that Sachs did not confer a benefit on Defendants with Jackson's sworn testimony 
admitting that Jackson did not sign a confidentiality agreement with UPCM, speak to 
Lesser about purchasing UPCM, or form CGP to purchase UPCM until after Plaintiff 
Sachs contacted him to purchase UPCM, and that Jackson never told Plaintiff Sachs that 
he was already involved in a deal with Rothwell to purchase UPCM. See, Id., ^32-37, 
55-56, Aplnt. Br. 16-17,21-22. 
Lesser and Loeb also argue that, "it is undisputed that defendants neither knew or 
should have known that Sachs expected to receive a fee as a consequence of Jackson's or 
CGP's purchase of UPCM, because by Sachs' own admission, the only purchaser about 
which defendants and Sachs had any discussions with Granite." (Emphasis supplied) 
L&L Br. 41; UPCM Br. 46. However, Defendants fail to mention that Sachs presented 
the record evidence disputing the foregoing assertions discussed above. See, "Statement 
of Facts", tH H-22, 28, 43, Aplnt. Br. 8-10, 11-13, 15, 18. 
Lesser & Loeb further assert that, "Sachs had no further communications with 
defendants regarding a finder's fee between May 17, 2001, and the time of CGP's 
purchase of UPCM." See L&L Br. 42. Again, Defendants fail to observe that Sachs 
disputed this assertion with evidence showing that on May 18, 2001, he wrote Rothwell 
8 
and Lesser a letter, acknowledging Lesser's preference for a purchaser rather than a joint 
venture partner, and stating that "another investor" with Granite might purchase UPCM, 
and that he would keep them advised of "all proposals whether for sale or for a joint 
venturing of the project", indicating that Sachs was not limiting potential purchasers to 
Granite. Plaintiff also presented evidence that immediately following his initial contact 
with Jackson, Sachs telephoned UPCM President Rothwell and informed him of 
Jackson's interest in purchasing UPCM based on Sachs' solicitation. See, "Statement of 
Facts", f22, 27-28, Aplnt. Br. 12-15. 
Finally, Defendants assertion that, "Sachs was, at most, an officious intermeddler 
in the transaction between CCP and UPCM" and that "it would be unjust for him to 
recover a multi-million dollar fee for alleged work that conferred no benefit on 
defendants and about which they were completely unaware", L&L Br. 43-44, is simply a 
self-serving adhominem attack on Plaintiff Sachs. This assertion is disputed by Plaintiff 
Sachs' evidence that on May 2, 2001, Lesser requested Sachs to find him a purchaser or 
joint venturer for UPCM and to "get the job done, whether it was with Granite, or 
someone else, or a combination", and then later on May 17, 2001, after receiving written 
notice of the fees Plaintiff Sachs would charge for his services, that Lesser telephoned 
Sachs and asked him to find a purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible. 
Plaintiff Sachs' evidence also shows that he found Jackson as a purchaser for 
UPCM, notified Rothwell that he had done so in accordance with Lesser's instruction, 
and that, as the result, Jackson created CGP which purchased the stock of UPCM for 
$67.2 million, conferring a substantial benefit on Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, and that 
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Lesser and Rothwell both agreed that Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee for 
locating Granite or Jackson to purchase UPCM, but denied that Sachs found Jackson. 
See, "Statement of Facts", ffif 11- 44, Aplnt. Br. 8-19, Add. 10, R. 1452. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' tactic of ignoring the genuinely disputed 
issues of material fact remaining for trial on Plaintiff Sachs' claims must be rejected. In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment by the lower court, the appellate court accords 
no deference to the district court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute, or the 
court's legal conclusions based on those facts. Additionally, an appellate court views the 
facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion and allows the summary judgment to stand only if Ihe movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. See, Republic Group, 
Inc. v. Won-door Corporation, 883 P.2d 285, 288-289 (Utah App. 1994); Sycamore 
Family, L.L.C.; and Leland Sycamore v. Vintage et al, 2006 UT App 387, ^2. 
Here, as in the district court, Plaintiff Sachs presents record evidence supporting 
each individual element of his claims for declaratory judgment and for breach of express 
and implied contract, from which a reasonable jury could find that the Lesser, on behalf 
of Loeb and UPCM, requested Plaintiff Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM after 
receiving written notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected for his services. See, 
"Statement of Facts", Aplnt Br. 5-22, and Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-36. 
Plaintiff Sachs also presented substantial case law holding that an express or 
implied contract arises under facts similar to those presented by Plaintiff Sachs, wherein 
one party to a contract manifests assent to a contract by requesting the performance of a 
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service after receiving notice of the fee the other party is expecting for the services. See, 
Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-36. This Court's recent decision in Alpha Partners, Inc. 
v. Transamerica Investment Management LLC, 2006 UT App. 331, also supports 
Plaintiff Sachs' argument that the district court erred in finding that the terms of the 
parties' contract were too indefinite to be enforced, because there was extrinsic evidence 
from which the terms could have been determined, and because a term of "reasonable 
compensation" may be implied in a contract. See, Id. at ^|24, citing Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, §204 (1981) and Coulter & Smith , Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 
1998) (stating as settled law Wooldridge v. Wareing, 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d 341, 
342 (1951) (reading implied term of reasonable compensation into an implied in fact 
service contract.); See also, Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-36. 
Because genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on Plaintiff 
Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and breach of express or implied contract and 
Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court should rule that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants on these claims and 
remand the case for a trial on the merits. 
POINT II THE PLAIN WORDS OF UREBA DO NOT PROHIBIT AN 
INDIVIDUAL FROM RECEIVING A FEE FOR FINDING A 
BUYER FOR THE STOCK OF A PUBLICLY HELD 
CORPORATION. THUS, THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THE GROUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED UNDER UREBA. 
A. UREBA Is A Penal Statute. 
Defendants' argument that the Utah Real Estate Broker's Act ("UREBA"), Aplnt. 
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Br. Add. 4, is not a penal statute based on cases from other jurisdictions involving 
different subject matters, L& L Br. 24-27, UPCM Br. 19-23, is incorrect. Defendants cite 
no Utah case to support this argument and Utah courts have traditionally considered Utah 
criminal and civil statutes imposing substantial monetary and criminal penalties to be 
penal in nature. See, Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management Inc., 
2006 UT 45, H1I 10-12, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, (Utah Forcible Detainer statute); State of 
Utah v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49,1fl| 17-19 (Utah Controlled Substances Act); I.M.L. v. State 
of Utah, 2002 UT 110,1J21, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah criminal libel statute); Jack B. Parsons 
Companies v. Nield et aL 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah 1988) (Utah statute providing 
double damages for wrongful failure to discharge or release mortgage); Shibata v. Bear 
River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 25 I, 254 (Utah 1949) (Utah statute providing 
double damages for wrongful failure to discharge or release mortgage). 
B. As A Penal Statute, UREBA Should Be Construed According To The Fair 
Import Of Its Provisions To Promote Justice And Effect The Objects Of Law 
And The General Purposes Outlined In §76-1-104, 
Lesser, Loeb and UPCM argue that the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of 
UREBA, incorporating the phrase "leaseholds and business opportunities involving real 
property", "reflects the legislature's intention that the real estate licensing provisions be 
given broad application." L&L. Br. 20-21, UPCM Br. 19-23. However, Utah rules of 
statutory interpretation do not require either a "broad" or "strict" interpretation of the 
words of a penal statute per se. While the determination of whether a real estate broker's 
licensing statute is, or is not a "penal statute" is significant in jurisdictions whose laws 
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expressly require penal statutes to be strictly construed, Utah law jettisons the rule. 
Section 76-1-106 provides that: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply 
to the provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, or any other offense 
defined by the laws of this state. All provisions of this code and 
offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be construed 
according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and 
effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of Section 76-
1-104. 
See, State v. Christensen, 2001 UT 14, ^ [3, 20 P.3d 329, quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
106. (Emphasis supplied) Section 76-1-104 identifies the general purposes of the laws 
of the State of Utah: 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of the offenses, 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which 
constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is without 
fault from condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offenses and which permit recognition or differences in 
rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders, and 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused 
or convicted of offenses. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Because UREBA prescribes criminal penalties for the violation of its licensing 
provisions under §61-2-17, including fines and imprisonment, the Court should strictly 
interpret UREBA according to its plain words to prevent the criminalization of innocent 
conduct not specifically prohibited under UREBA, consistent with the requirements for 
federal and state constitutional due process notice and the purposes of §76-1-104(2). See, 
Argument, Point IIA, Aplnt. Br. 36-29. See also, State of Utah v. Moonev, 2004 UT 49, 
H17. 
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C. The Terms "Business" And "Business Opportunity Involving Real Property" 
Incorporated In The Definition of "Real Estate" in UREBA Are Undefined 
And Would Not Commonly Be Understood As Encompassing An Agreement 
To Pay An Individual A Fee For Locating A Buyer For The Stock Of A 
Publicly Held Corporation. 
In Peterson v. Sunrider, 2002 UT 43, ^ [27, 48 P.3d 918, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the determination of whether a contract is illegal or unenforceable based on a 
penal statute requires thee steps. The court must determine: (1) what the terms of the 
contract are; (2) what the statute prohibits; and (3) whether the statute or public policy 
demands that the contract be deemed unenforceable. In determining whether UREBA 
prohibits the enforcement of an agreement to pay an individual a fee for finding a buyer 
for the stock of a publicly held corporation, "the words of a statute should be interpreted 
in accord with their usual and accepted meaning'' Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort 808 
P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). (Emphasis supplied) 
Even employing a "broad interpretation" of UREBA advocated by Defendants, 
L&L Br. 24-26 and UPCM Br. 19-25, the "usual and accepted meaning" of the phrase 
"business opportunities involving real property" used to define the term "real estate" in 
§61-2-2(14), would not be understood as relating to finding a buyer for the stock of a 
publicly traded corporation in exchange for a fee, particularly where the terms "business" 
and "business opportunities" used in §61-2-2(14), are not defined in UREBA. 
Although Defendants quote Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1959) (cited 
in both Defendants' briefs as Chade v. Morgan), as support for their argument that the 
definition of "real estate" in UREBA requires a "broad cover coverage be given to the 
term 'real estate' for the purposes of the Act," See, L&L Br. 20; UPCM Br. 16, the quote 
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is taken out of context. In Chase, the Utah Supreme Court actually stated that: 
Appellant's third contention that oil and gas leases are not 'real 
estate' because they were ordinarily estates for years and under the 
common law were classified as chattels real and considered personal 
property might have been persuasive were it not for the fact that 
[continuing with language quoted by Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, L&L 
Br. 25; UPCM Br. 16] the legislature saw fit to include within the 
definition of the term 'real estate9 leaseholds and other interests 
less than leaseholds. This clearly indicates the intention of the 
legislature that a broad coverage be given to the term 'real estate' for 
the purposes of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) 
Thus, in Chase, the Utah Supreme Court indicates that had the Utah Legislature 
not expressly included the terms "leasehold and other interests less than leaseholds" in 
the definition of "real estate", the Court would likely not have interpreted the term "real 
estate" in UREBA as including oil and gas leases. Id. at 1020. Similarly, in the instant 
case, the Court should decline to interpret the phrase "business opportunity involving real 
property" used to define the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA to include 
finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation, where the terms "business", 
"business opportunity involving real property" are undefined and would not be 
commonly understood as encompassing stock transactions. See, LM.L. v. State of Utah, 
2002 UT 110, Tfl2, ("[We] will not 'infer substantive terms into the text that are not 
already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and [we 
have 'no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'") 
(internal citations omitted)5 
Plaintiff Sachs does not dispute that one must be licensed as a real estate broker to 
receive a fee for finding a buyer for the real property assets of a corporation. See, 
Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc.. 584 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
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D. Had The Utah Legislature Decided To Abolish The Historic Distinction 
Between Stock As Personal Property And Corporate Real Estate As Real 
Property In UREBA, It Would Have Done So Expressly. 
UREBA is limited to transactions involving real estate. Defendants wholly fail to 
counter Plaintiff Sachs' argument that if the Utah Legislature had intended to include the 
sale of a corporation's stock in the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), it would 
have expressly declared this intention, because the term "real estate" would not be 
generally understood as including the stock of a corporation. (Emphasis supplied). See, 
Argument, Point IIB, Aplnt. Br. 39-40. Instead, Defendants cite cases involving real 
estate assets rather than the purchase of the stock of a publicly held corporation at issue 
here. Defendants also cite cases from other jurisdictions whose laws define the terms 
"real estate", "business", or "business opportunity", to include the sale of the stock of a 
1978), cited L&L Br. 19. However, Plaintiff Sachs contends that the term "real estate" in 
UREBA does not encompass an agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a publicly held 
corporation, as opposed to its real property assets. Diversified did not involve the 
purchase of the stock of the corporation as in the instant case. Id. at 849. 
6
 The following cases involve the sale of real property and/or lease assets: Andalex 
Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994) (coal leases); Blackthorne Group v. 
Pines of Newmarket 848 A.2d 725, 727-728 (N.H. 2004) (Asset sale of assisted living 
facility); Chapin v. Neuhoff, 684 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Neb. 2004) (Sale of a radio station 
and lease); GDC Environmental Services, Inc. v. Ransbottom Landfill 740 N.E.2d 1254, 
1256 (Ind. App. 2000) (Asset sale of a landfill); Lockridge v. Hale, 764 S.W.2d 84, 85 
(Ky. App. 1989) (Asset sale of a horse farm); Ford v. American Medical International, 
422 N.W.2d 67, 68-69 (Neb. 1988) (Sale of a hospital which held a lease); Knight v. 
Johnson, 741 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Mo. App. 1987) (Sale of car wash business contingent on 
assumption of a lease); Berchenko v. Fulton 261 S.E.2d 643, 644 (Ga. 1979) (sale of 
mobile home park); Thomas v. Jarvis, 518 P.2d 532, 533-534 (Kan. 1974) (Asset sale of 
corporation); Bonasera v. Roffe, 442 P.2d 165, 165 (Ariz. App. 1968) (Sale of a tavern 
business and a lease); Doran v. Imeson Aviation 419 F. Supp 586, 587 (D.C. Wyo. 1976) 
(Sale of airport service business and leases); Folsom v. Callen, 131 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. 
App. 1956) (Sale of a hotel business and its lease); Thomas v. Daubs, 684 N.E.2d 1011, 
1012 (111. App. 1997) (Asset sale of a landfill). 
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corporation where the corporation has any interest in real estate, or an interest in real 
estate that is deemed to be more than incidental. See, L&L Br. 20-23; UPCM Br. 16-18.7 
However, the provisions of the statutes considered in these cases are different from the 
provisions of UREBA. Finally, Defendants cite Shortt v. Knob City Investment Co., Inc., 
292 S.E.2d 737 738-740 (N.C. 1982). See, L&L Br. 28, n.9. There, a real estate broker 
sued for his commission on the sale of real estate listed by him pursuant to an exclusive 
written listing agreement with the defendant corporation. The defendant refused to pay 
the commission because, instead of conveying the real estate to the purchaser, the 
company's four shareholders conveyed 100% of their stock to the purchaser, which the 
corporation contended was not the sale of real estate. This case is inapplicable here 
because Plaintiff Sachs was not a real estate broker and did not offer or agree to find or 
o 
list any real estate of UPCM in return for a finder's fee. Thus, none of the case law 
cited by Defendants compels this Court to interpret the terms "business" or "business 
opportunities involving real property" used to define "real estate" under §61-2-2(14) of 
UREBA, to include finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation. 
The following cases involve stock transactions under state statutes interpreted as 
requiring licensing for stock transactions involving sale of business owning real estate: 
Leiffv.Medco. 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. App. 1998) (Colorado REBA); Brakhage v. 
Georgetown Associates, 523 P.2d 145, 147 (Colo. App. 1974) (Colorado REBA); March 
Group v. Bellar. 908 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. App. 1995) (Tenn. REBA); Everett v. 
Goodloe, 602 S.E.2d 284, 286-287 (Ga. App.2004) (Georgia REBA); Coonev v. Ritter, 
939 F.2d 81, 88, (3rd Circ, 1991) (New Jersey REBA); All Points Traders v. Barrington 
Associates 259 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782-786 (Cal. App. 1989) (California REBA). 
8
 See, "Statement of Facts", \\ 11-22, Aplnt. Br. 8-13. 
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The fact that Utah jurisprudence regards the distinction between the sale of a 
corporation's assets (including its real estate) versus the sale of a corporation's stock as 
fundamental and not incidental, also weighs against such an interpretation. For example, 
in Decius v. Action Collections, 2004 UT App. 484, 105 P.3d 956, this Court recently 
reaffirmed that transfers of corporate assets and corporate stock are fundamentally 
different, such that for purposes of corporate "successor liability" in Utah, the purchaser 
of a corporation's assets generally does not acquire the liabilities of the corporation, 
whereas a purchaser of the corporation's stock in a merger, as occurred in this case, does 
acquire its liabilities. Id. at 958-959. 
Similarly, in Bertha v. Remy Int'l 414 F.Supp.2d 869 (E.D. Wis., 2006) the 
federal district court, applying Wisconsin law, recently denied a motion to dismiss an 
action by an individual seeking to enforce a fee contract for finding a buyer for a business 
in a stock sale transaction, because the Wisconsin Real Estate Broker's Act, like UREBA, 
did not define the term "business", and the district court did not believe that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court would disregard the distinction between the sale of a 
corporation's real estate assets and the sale of its stock given its historical adherence to 
the distinction. Id. at 880-881. See also, 17 Williston on Contracts, §51:2 (4th ed. 2006), 
Aplnt. Br. Add. 6; Cruising World v. Westermeyer, 351 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. App. 1977). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should decline the invitation of Lesser, Loeb 
and UPCM to broadly interpret the terms "business" and "business opportunity involving 
real estate" in UREBA to encompass the an agreement to pay an individual a fee for 
locating a purchaser for the stock of a publicly held corporation. 
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E. UREBA Should Be Interpreted To Avoid Criminalizing Conduct Not Plainly 
Prohibited Under Its Provisions. 
The statutory interpretation of UREBA is circumscribed by the plain language of 
the statute, legislative intent and the requirements of due process. "[Due process] 
guarantees do not permit enforcement of a penal statute that forbids an act in terms so 
vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's 
meaning and differ as to its application." State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, [^17. See also, 
Argument, Point IIA, Aplnt. Br. 36-39. 
As previously noted, the terms "business" and "business opportunity" are not 
currently defined in §61-2-2 of UREBA, and were not defined in UREBA in 2001 when 
the events in this case occurred. In 1985, the Utah Legislature repealedthe definition of 
"business opportunity" then contained in §61-2-2(5) of UREBA as, "an existing business, 
a business and its good will, a business franchise, or any combination of them." Aplnt. 
Br. Add. 7 at 19. This legislative action belies Defendants' argument that the Utah 
Legislature intended to include finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held 
corporation within the ambit of the phrase "business opportunities involving real 
property" used to define the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA. L&L Br. 24-
30;UPCMBr. 19-25. 
The only definition of "business opportunity" contained in Utah statutes in 2001, 
or currently, is found in the Utah Business Opportunity Act, §13-15-2(2), which defines 
"business opportunity" as "an assisted marketing plan subject to this chapter." See, Aplnt. 
Add. 8 (attached). Thus, in 2001, there was simply nothing in the definition of "real 
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estate" contained in §61-2-2(14), or any other provision of UREBA, that would have 
given due process notice to citizens of common intelligence, including Plaintiff Sachs, 
that an individual was required to be licensed as a real estate broker in order to obtain a 
fee for finding a buyer for the stock of UPCM, a publicly held company.9 
Defendants' argument that because Sachs is not being criminally prosecuted or 
fined for violating the act, that UREBA is not penal, L&L Br. at 25, UPCM Br. 19, is the 
proverbial "tail wagging the dog." That Plaintiff Sachs is not currently being criminally 
prosecuted under UREBA does not mean that Plaintiff Sachs is not being punished under 
the statute. To the contrary, the fact that he is not licensed as a real estate broker under 
UREBA is being used to deny him a substantial fee for locating a buyer for UPCM. 
Moreover, were this Court to retroactively interpret UREBA as requiring Plaintiff 
Sachs to have been licensed as a real estate broker in order to find a buyer for the stock of 
UPCM, a publicly held corporation, Plaintiff Sachs would be subject to the criminal 
penalties under §61-2-17 of UREBA even though a person of common intelligence would 
not have been able to discern from the plain language of UREBA that such a transaction 
required a real estate broker's license. "The ambiguity in the statute is such that the scope 
of its ... prohibition cannot be decisively interpreted by lawyers, to say nothing of 
9
 Lesser's and Loeb's reliance on Springer v. Rosauer, 641 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1982) for its argument that even under a "strict construction" Sachs was 
required to be licensed, See L&L Br., is unwarranted. That case involved the construction 
of a Washington statute that expressly defined the term "business opportunity" to mean 
and include "business, business opportunity and good will of an existing business or any 
one or a combination thereof," whereas UREBA does not define this term, and in 1985, 
the Utah Legislature repealed the definition of "business opportunity" similar to that 
contained in the Washington statute in Springer. 
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citizens untrained in law. This weighs strongly against any interpretation that would 
enable to state to initiate criminal prosecution based on arguably legitimate conduct." 
State of Utah v. Mooney, supra, at ^|18. Defendants cannot surmount the due process 
implications of the ambiguous language of UREBA by arguing that there is no express 
exemption for finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation in UREBA. 
See, L&L Br. 27; UPCM Br. 24. Barbers and shipbuilding are not exempted under 
UREBA but also are clearly not covered under the plain words of the Act. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should decline Defendants' invitation to 
interpret UREBA to criminalize conduct not plainly prohibited under its provisions and 
hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants on 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims on the ground that such claims were barred under UREBA. 
POINT III NEITHER UREBA NOR PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT 
DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT TO PAY PLAINTIFF SACHS A FEE 
FOR FINDING A BUYER FOR THE STOCK OF UPCM BE 
DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE. THUS, THE COURT SHOULD 
HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THE GROUND 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UREBA. 
Plaintiff Sachs does not dispute that in addition to punishing individuals who 
violate its licensing provisions, a primary purpose of UREBA is "to protect members of 
the public who rely on licensed real estate brokers and salesmen to perform tasks that 
require a high degree of honesty and integrity", See L&L Br. 24; UPCM Br. 19-23. 
However, this regulatory purpose does not preclude UREBA from being considered a 
"penal statute" given the monetary and criminal penalties prescribed for the violation of 
its licensing provisions in §61-2-17 of the Act, Aplnt. Br. Add. 4. 
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The regulatory purpose of UREBA has also not deterred Utah courts from finding 
the Act's licensing requirements inapplicable in cases where, as here, sophisticated 
business brokers or real estate developers, including Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, whose 
interests were not designed to be protected by UREBA, attempt to invoke UREBA as a 
shield against the performance of their just contractual obligations. Thus, in Global 
Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1980), cited 
L&L Br. 24; UPCM Br. 21, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "The purpose of these 
provisions is not to protect real estate developers who seek relief from their own 
contractual obligations."10 In the instant case, Plaintiff Sachs presented record evidence 
indicating that at the time he requested Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM, Lesser had 
been a real estate broker and investor in New York for over 30 years, and UPCM's 
President, Rothwell, had been a real estate broker, developer and investor in Utah for 
over 30 years. An investment banking firm and numerous attorneys also represented 
Contrary to Defendants' argument, L&L Br. 32-33, this Court's decision in 
Andalex does not compel a different result. In Andalex, the plaintiff admitted his action 
to recover a finder's fee for locating a buyer for the defendants' coal leases was barred 
under the unambiguous language of UREBA requiring a real estate broker's license for 
such transactions, but argued that the purpose of the statute was to protect the public and 
not to protect "sophisticated corporate entities" and that this purpose should override the 
literal terms of UREBA to permit his suit. This Court rejected the argument, holding that, 
"If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not look beyond the 
language of the statute to make the language conform to a purpose not expressed." Id. at 
1045. By contrast, in the instant case, the term "real estate" and the terms "business" and 
"business opportunity involving real property" used to define the term "real estate" in 
§61-2-2(14) of UREBA, do not literally or unambiguously prohibit plaintiff Sachs' 
conduct in finding a purchaser for the stock of a publicly held corporation, as opposed to 
the real property assets of a corporation, without a real estate broker's license. Under this 
circumstance, resort to the purposes of UREBA is appropriate in determining whether 
such conduct implicates the licensing requirements of the Act. 
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Lesser, Loeb in the sale of UPCM's stock. Rothwell had personally known Sachs for 15 
to 20 years as a business consultant who worked on a fee basis and UPCM had paid a fee 
to Sachs in an earlier transaction. See, "Statement of Facts", ^ | 2, 5-6, 9, 54, Aplnt. Br. 7-
8, 21. Thus, Defendants Lesser, Loeb and UPCM were themselves, or were represented 
by, experienced and sophisticated real estate brokers and other business professionals in 
the sale of UPCM and did not require the protection from unscrupulous real estate 
brokers afforded to unsophisticated members of the public by the real estate broker 
licensing requirements of UREBA in the transaction. Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1990) ("When the contracting party possesses 
knowledge and expertise in the field, it is not within the class of persons in need of the 
protection that the licensing statute was intended to provide.") 
Moreover, Defendants were not the victims of any substantive evil designed to be 
prevented by the real estate broker licensing provisions of UREBA. See, Peterson v. 
Sunrider, 2002 UT 43, Tf39, ("In considering the public policy regarding enforcement, the 
court must consider whether holding the contract unenforceable is to the benefit or 
detriment of the parties the statute is designed to protect. 6 A Arthur Linton Corbin, 
Corbin On Contracts §1513.") Viewing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff Sachs, 
Lesser, Loeb and UPCM got exactly what they wanted as the result of their agreement 
with Sachs, namely a buyer to purchase UPCM for $67.2 million dollars, a substantial 
benefit which Defendants readily accepted. Moreover, Lesser, Rothwell and Jackson 
have a motive to falsify the nature of their dealings with Plaintiff Sachs to avoid the 
payment of his finder's fee. See, "Statement of Facts", ffif 1-39, 44, 55-56, Aplnt. Br. 5-
23 
17, 19, 21-22. Thus, the regulatory purpose of UREBA in no way requires that the 
subject finder's fee agreement be deemed unenforceable.11 
Furthermore, the public policy of Utah favors the enforcement of valid contracts 
and has long invoked doctrines of equity, including equitable estoppel and acquiescence, 
to prevent parties who have accepted the benefits of a contract from unjustly disaffirming 
their contractual obligation to pay the party who conferred the benefit. "It has been 
repeatedly held that a person by acceptance of the benefits may be estopped from 
questioning the existence, validity and effect of a contract." Swan Creek Village 
Homeowners Assn. v. Warner, 2006 UT 22,1J35, quoting Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 
289 P. 151, 154 (Utah 1930), and Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 
(Utah 1985) (listing the elements of equitable estoppel). 
Here, the evidence viewed most favorably toward Plaintiff Sachs, shows that 
Lesser, Loeb and UPCM received $67.2 million dollars for the purchase of UPCM's 
stock as the direct result of Plaintiff Sachs' efforts in locating Jackson to purchase 
UPCM. See, "Statement of Facts", ffif 1- 44, Aplnt. Br. 5-19. Thus, Defendants should be 
Even assuming arguendo that the parties' agreement did violate the regulatory 
purpose of UREBA, which Plaintiff Sachs disputes, the fact that a contract serves a 
prohibited statutory purpose does not necessarily make the contract unenforceable. See, 
Peterson v. Sunrider, supra, ^39, quoting McCormick v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 308 P.2d 
949, 951 (Utah 1957) ("Arbitrary refusal to grant relief under contracts merely in 
violation of statute often brings about such incongruous results in giving advantages to 
wrongdoers and penalizing the relatively innocent that the courts have carved out so 
many exceptions to the so-called 'general rule5 that it can hardly be properly so 
denominated"); See also, 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §1373 (1962). 
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equitably estopped to assert UREBA as a defense to Plaintiff Sachs' contract claims for 
payment of his fees. 
The courts of this state have also found ratification of a contract "under 
circumstances of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not promptly exercised" 
and "even though certain express formalities have not been met." Swan Creek, supra, 
f34, citing Aggeller & Musser Seed Co. v. Blood, 272 P. 933, 937 (Utah 1928) 
(indicating that "acceptance of services rendered with full knowledge of the contract 
under which rendered is a ratification of such contract."); Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 
P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1974), ("delay in repudiation gives rise to an implied or de facto 
ratification of [a] contract"), and Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 
B.P.O.E., 56 P.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Utah 1974) ("Ratification may be implied by 
acquiescence in, or recognition of, the act of the officers by the corporation or by acts 
tending to show an acceptance or adoption of the contract.") 
Again, the evidence viewed most favorably to Plaintiff Sachs shows that 
Defendants ratified the subject finder's fee agreement, in that neither Lesser, on behalf of 
Loeb and UPCM, nor Rothwell, on behalf of UPCM, ever told Sachs prior to Jackson's 
purchase of UPCM, that they would not pay him the finder's fee outlined in his letter of 
May 17, 2001. See, "Statement of Facts", Ht 16-20, 22, 28, Aplnt. Br. 10-13, 15. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should hold that there is nothing in the 
purpose of UREBA or the public policy of the State of Utah requiring that Plaintiff 
Sachs' finder fee agreement with Defendants be deemed unenforceable, and that the 
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district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that 
Plaintiffs' claims were barred under UREBA. 
POINT IV THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT RENDER THE 
DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT TO PAY PLAINTIFF SACHS A 
FINDER'S FEE FOR LOCATING JACKSON TO PURCHASE THE 
STOCK OF UPCM UNENFORCEABLE AND DEFENDANTS ARE 
EQUITABLY ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE STATUTE AS A 
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS. THUS, THIS COURT 
SHOULD HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS BASED 
ON ITS CONTRARY CONCLUSIONS. 
A. Defendants Concede That The Plain Words Of The Utah Statute Of Frauds 
Do Not Require That An Agreement To Pay An Individual A Fee For Finding 
A Buyer For The Stock Of A Corporation Be In Writing To Be Enforceable. 
By arguing that §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Statute of Frauds ["every agreement 
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation" (Emphasis supplied)], prohibits an agreement to pay an individual a fee 
for finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation only when read "in pari 
materia" with the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, See, L&L Br. 35; 
UPCM Br. 27, n. 15, Defendants concede that the plain words of §25-5-4(5) of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds do not require that such an agreement be in writing to be enforceable. 
See, Argument, Point III, Aplnt. Br. 45-48, and Aplnt. Br. Add. 5. 
Defendants "in pari materia" argument is also flawed because the term "real 
estate" as defined in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, would not be commonly understood to 
include the stock of a publicly held corporation. See, Argument, Point II, supra, at 12. 
Thus, neither statute, alone or together, provides that a transaction involving the sale of 
the stock of a publicly held corporation constitutes "real estate". 
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Because §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Statute of Frauds does not require an agreement to 
pay an individual a fee for locating a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation, 
UPCM's argument that Plaintiff Sachs' letter to Defendants indicating the fee he would 
charge for his services does not comply with the requirements for a writing under the 
Utah Statute of Frauds, UPCM Br. 28-30, is irrelevant. 
B. Plaintiff Sachs' Full Performance Of The Finder's Fee Agreement Permits Its 
Enforcement Takes The Agreement Out Of The Statute Of Frauds. 
Lesser and Loeb's argument that "a real estate broker or agent cannot recover [a] 
commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for real 
property unless ... there is an express contract", and that in such case "performance or 
part performance of a parol agreement is unavailing", (Emphasis supplied), See, L&L Br. 
36 (citing cases), is inapplicable to this case because the record evidence viewed most 
favorably to Plaintiff Sachs, demonstrates that Lesser, on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, 
never requested Plaintiff Sachs to, and Plaintiff Sachs never agreed to, procure a 
purchaser for the real property assets of UPCM, but only agreed to find a buyer for the 
publicly traded stock of the corporation in exchange for the fee described in his letter of 
May 17, 2001, to Rothwell and Lesser. (Emphasis supplied) See, "Statement of Facts", 
1f1f 11, 13, 15, 19-22, 40, Aplnt. Br. 8-12, and Letter of May 17 2001, Aplnt. Br. Add. 2. 
Lesser and Loeb's alternative argument that "even if the doctrine of part 
performance was available, Sachs has failed to establish the requisite elements with 
'strong* evidence," citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^24, 44 P.3d 742, L&L Br. 36-37, 
is unavailing. The strong evidence referred to in Spears refers to the Court's preference 
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for "acts-oriented" rather than "word-oriented" evidence consisting of acts of the plaintiff 
that "must be exclusively referable to the contract... and reasonably explicable only on 
the postulate that a contract exists." Id. |24. In Spears, the Utah Supreme Court also 
explained that, "under certain circumstances the exclusively referable requirement may 
be relaxed," and that, "The more conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less 
stringent the requirement of exclusively referable acts." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Here, Plaintiff Sachs presented abundant evidence that he fully performed his agreement 
with Lesser, on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, to find a buyer for the stock of UPCM for a 
reasonable and customary fee, and that Defendants received the benefit of $67.2 million 
dollars as the result of Jackson's purchase of the stock of UPCM, the majority of which 
was owned by Lesser and Loeb. Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to 
permit Defendants to raise the Utah Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiff Sachs' 
claims. After all, the purpose of the Statute is to prevent frauds, not to permit defendants 
to perpetrate a fraud on Plaintiff Sachs. 
Plaintiff Sachs' evidence of acts exclusively referable to his finder's fee agreement 
with Defendants, include Sachs' acts of: (1) contacting Jackson pursuant to Lesser's 
request of May 17, 2001, that Sachs find a purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible, 
after Lesser received written notice of the fees Sachs would charge for his services in 
finding a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM earlier that day; (2) requesting Rothwell 
and Lesser to contact him if they had any question about the finder's fee referred to in his 
letter of May 17, 2001; (3) delivering another letter to Rothwell on May 18, 2001, 
confirming Lesser's preference for a purchaser for UPCM and stating that he would keep 
them informed of all prospective purchasers; (4) advising Jackson to contact Rothwell to 
get a confidentiality agreement so that he could obtain information relevant to his 
purchase of UPCM and to contact Sachs after Jackson had spoken to Rothwell pursuant 
to Lesser's instruction to Sachs to refer all prospects to Rothwell; (5) contacting Rothwell 
to advise him of Jackson's interest in purchasing UPCM as the result of the information 
Sachs provided to Jackson; (6) advising Jackson that Granite, might be interested in 
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Although Lesser and Loeb attempt to argue that the foregoing acts are not 
referable to the parties' contract, by asserting that, "Sachs never attended any meetings 
between UPCM and Jackson, was never asked to sign a confidentiality agreement with 
UPCM and never participated in any negotiations with UPCM", L&L Br. 37, Sachs did 
not need to perform any of the foregoing acts to fulfill his agreement with Defendants to 
locate a purchaser for UPCM, which he fully performed by locating Jackson as a 
purchaser for UPCM, referring Jackson to Rothwell and advising Rothwell of Jackson's 
interest in purchasing UPCM based on Sachs' solicitation. See, Id. 
C. Sachs' Acts Were In Reliance On The Contract. 
Lesser and Loeb alternatively argue that, "Sachs' efforts were not done in reliance 
on the alleged contract.. .but were in pursuit of a deal he was attempting to arrange for his 
client Granite", L&L Br. 37. This argument is unsupported and disputes Plaintiff Sachs' 
record evidence demonstrating that following Lesser's request May 17, 2001 request to 
Sachs to find a buyer for UPCM as quickly as possible, Sachs contacted Jackson to 
purchase UPCM, and that following his initial solicitation of Jackson, Sachs focused his 
efforts on supporting Jackson's bid to purchase UPCM Sachs, based on the immediate 
purchasing UPCM with Jackson; (7) calling Granite to see if Granite would be interested 
in purchasing UPCM with Jackson; (8) refraining from contacting other parties to 
purchase UPCM after Jackson thanked Sachs for the information he provided and 
indicated to Sachs his interest in putting a deal together to purchase UPCM; (9) 
contacting Jackson frequently thereafter to ascertain his progress in purchasing UPCM; 
and (10) requesting the payment of his finder's fee from UPCM at the time Jackson 
completed his purchase of UPCM. Sachs also presented evidence that Rothwell admitted 
that Sachs would not have engaged in these acts merely as a "volunteer" without 
expectation of payment. See, "Statement of Facts", fflf 23-49, Aplnt. Br. 13-20. 
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interest Jackson had expressed in purchasing UPCM in response to Sachs' solicitation, 
and based on Sachs' belief that Jackson had the ability and resources to purchase UPCM, 
such that Sachs would receive his finder's fee from Defendants. See, "Statement of 
Facts", TfTf 29-46, Aplnt. Br. 15-19. Based upon the foregoing, the Court should rule that 
the Utah Statute of Frauds does not apply to the parties' finder's fee agreement. 
Alternatively, the Court should rule that genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain 
for trial regarding (1) whether Plaintiff Sachs fully performed his obligations under the 
parties' finder fee agreement, such that the agreement is taken outside of the Statute of 
Frauds, and/or (2) whether Defendants are estopped to raise the Statute of Frauds as a 
defense to Plaintiff Sachs' claims in this case. Thus, the Court should reverse the district 
court's summary judgment for Defendants based on its incorrect conclusion that Plaintiff 
Sachs' claims are barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment, breach of express or implied 
contract are not barred under UREB A or the Utah Statute of Frauds, and the evidence 
viewed most favorably to Plaintiff Sachs discloses that genuinely disputed issues of 
material fact remain for trial on each of Plaintiff Sachs' claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
Sachs respectfully requests that the Court reverse the contrary judgment of the district 
court and remand this case for a trial on the merits. 
DATED and respectfully submitted this 10th day of October 2006. 
KIATHRYHICOLLARD" 3 
Attorney For Appellant Ira Sachs 
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INDEX TO APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ADDENDUM 
These addenda are attached to Appellant's Opening Brief. 
Utah Business Opportunity Disclosure Act, §13-15-1 et. seq. 
Lesser Deposition Excerpts, R. 1411-1412 
Fax from Rothwell to Sachs, dated August 19, 2003, R. 1452 
Tab 8 
WeSmr. 
Page 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
-f Chapter 15. Business Opportunity Disclosure Act 
§ 13-15-1. Short title 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Business Opportunity Disclosure 
Act. " 
§ 13-15-2. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1)(a) "Assisted marketing plan" means the sale or lease of any products, 
equipment, supplies, or services that are sold to the purchaser upon payment of an 
initial required consideration of $300 or more for the purpose of enabling the 
purchaser to start a business, and in which the seller represents: 
(i) that the seller will provide locations or assist the purchaser in finding 
locations for the use or operation of vending machines, racks, display cases, 
or other similar devices, or currency operated amusement machines or devices, 
on premises neither owned nor leased by the purchaser or seller; 
(ii) that the seller will purchase any or all products made, produced, 
fabricated, grown, or modified by the purchaser, using in whole or in part the 
supplies, services, or chattels sold to the purchaser; 
(iii) that the seller will provide the purchaser with a guarantee that the 
purchaser will receive income from the assisted marketing plan that exceeds the 
price paid for the assisted marketing plan, or repurchase any of the products, 
equipment, supplies, or chattels supplied by the seller if the purchaser is 
dissatisfied with the assisted marketing plan; or 
(iv) that upon payment by the purchaser of a fee or sum of money, which exceeds 
$300 to the seller, the seller will provide a sales program or marketing 
program that will enable the purchaser to derive income from the assisted 
marketing plan that exceeds the price paid for the marketing plan. 
(b) "Assisted marketing plan" does not include: 
(i) the sale of an ongoing business when the owner of that business sells and 
intends to sell only that one assisted marketing plan; 
(ii) not-for-profit sale of sales demonstration equipment, materials, or 
samples for a total price of $300 or less; or 
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( m ) the sale of a package franchise or a product franchise defined by and in 
compliance with Federal Trade Commission rules governing franchise and business 
opportunity ventures. 
(c) As used in Subsection (1) (a) ( m ) "guarantee" means a written agreement, 
signed by the purchaser and seller, disclosing the complete details and any 
limitations or exceptions of the agreement. 
(2) "Business opportunity" means an assisted marketing plan subject to this 
chapter. 
(3) "Division" means the Division of Consumer Protection of the Department of 
Commerce. 
(4) (a) "Initial required consideration" means the total amount a purchaser is 
obligated to pay under the terms of the assisted marketing plan, either prior to 
or at the time of delivery of the products, equipment, supplies, or services, or 
within six months of the commencement of operation of the assisted marketing plan 
by the purchaser If payment is over a period of time, "initial required 
consideration" means the sum of the down payment and the total monthly payments 
(b) "Initial required consideration" does not mean the not-for-profit sale of 
sales demonstration equipment, materials, or supplies for a total price of less 
than $300 
(5) "Person" means any natural person, corporation, partnership, organization, 
association, trust, or any other legal entity. 
(6) "Purchaser" means a person who becomes obligated to pay for an assisted 
marketing plan. 
(7) "Registered trademark" or "service mark" means a trademark, trade name, or 
service mark registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or 
Utah, or the state of incorporation if a corporation. 
(8) "Seller" means a person who sells or offers to sell an assisted marketing plan. 
§ 13-15-3. Administration and enforcement--Powers--Legal counsel--Fees 
(1) The division shall administer and enforce this chapter. In the exercise of 
its responsibilities, the division shall enjoy the powers, and be subject to the 
constraints, set forth in Title 13, Chapter 2, Division of Consumer Protection 
(2) The attorney general, upon request, shall give legal advice to, and act as 
counsel for, the division in the exercise of its responsibilities under this 
chapter 
(3) All fees collected under this chapter shall be deposited in the Commerce 
Service Fund. 
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1 Lesser 
2 say okay, thatfs still not enough money and 
3 just reject the deal? 
4 A Because at that point that was the 
5 highest price that somebody would pay for it. 
6 Q. Was there some reason you had to 
7 accept that price? 
8 A No, other than we felt that it was 
9 time to sell. 
10 Q. And when you say "we felt it was 
11 time to sell," who are you referring to, 
12 Loeb? 
13 A The board of directors of United 
14 Park City Mines. 
15 Q. What about Loeb? 
16 A What about Loeb? 
117 Q. They felt it was time to sell? 
118 A As shareholders we solicited their 
19 views and they were in favor of the sale, 
20 just as we solicited the views of all the 
I 21 shareholders and all the shareholders agreed 
22 to the sale. 
23 Q. Were the shareholders presented 
j 24 with the alternative of just waiting for 
25 another purchaser, or soliciting another 
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1 Lesser 
2 business with or if they are not financially 
3 sound and they had to put out the wherewithal 
4 to consummate the purchase. 
5 Q. Have you ever discussed with Hank 
6 Rothwell why he didn't immediately respond to 
7 Mr. Sachs letter, his first letter stating 
8 that he would expect a finder's fee and tell 
9 him no, he wasn't going get a finder's fee if 
10 that was your position? 
11 MS SCOTT: Objection. Assumes 
12 facts not in evidence. 
13 MR.WATKISS: It was quite vague 
14 too, Kathy. 
15 Q. Have you ever talked to 
16 Mr. Rothwell about why he didn't upon 
17 receiving Mr. Sachs first letter requesting a 
18 finder's fee confirming that he would be 
19 expecting that, write back to Mr. Sachs and 
20 say no, you are not going do get a finder's 
21 fee, we don't agree with that? 
22 MS SCOTT: Same objection. j 
23 MR. WATKISS: Hard to follow. 
24 A. I'm having difficulty. 
25 Q. You've indicated that it was your 
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1 Lesser 
2 purchaser? 
3 A. I don't think any — I think that's 
4 a determination usually of the board to 
5 accept or reject an offer for the company, 
6 and then they go out and get the consent of 
7 the shareholders to that proposal. And the 
8 consent was overwhelmingly in favor of taking 
9 the $21 a share. 
10 Q. Overwhelmingly, you mean — 
11 A. I think it's a matter of record as 
12 to what the vote was. 
13 Q. This is in the absence of any 
14 alternatives it was either the $21 a share or 
15 nothing? 
16 MR. WATKISS: Argumentative. 
17 Q. Well, I mean, there weren't any 
18 other purchasers around; isn't that true? 
19 A. At that price, on that date the 
| 20 answer is, yes. And incidentally, as I said 
21 before, if there was another purchaser 
! 22 around, all they had to do was to come in and 
I 23 make an offer. It's a public company. 
24 You've got to accept those offers unless the 
! 25 people are people that you dont want to do 
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1 Lesser 
2 position and Mr. Rothwell's position that 
3 Mr. Sachs was not entitled to a finder's fee, 
4 correct? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. And you're aware that Mr. Sachs 
7 sent a fax to Mr. Rothwell indicating that if 
8 this transaction goes through I'm going to 
9 expect a modest finder's fee? 
10 A. I believe you showed me a letter to 
11 that effect. 
12 Q. This letter on the 17th. 
13 MS SCOTT: Aod by this transaction 
14 you mean the transaction with Granite? 
15 MS COLLARD: At tie time with 
16 Granite. 
17 A. I've already told you that if he 
18 would have been responsible for Granite 
19 purchasing and consummating the purchase, 
20 since he came into see me at lunch with 
21 Granite at that time it was a joint venture, 
22 I think they really wanted a engineering 
23 contract, be that as it may, if we would have 
24 done a deal where Granite bought the company 
25 and we would have recognize Mr. Sachs as the 
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Lesser At 
2 broker in the transaction and he would have 
3 been entitled to a fee. 
4 Q. Wouldn't that have been true if he 
5 brought in Mr. Jackson? 
6 A. If he had brought in Mr. Jackson 
7 and Mr. Jackson consummated the purchase ye; 
8 that would be true, but as I understand it he 
9 did not bring in Mr. Jackson. 
10 Q. But that's based on whatever you 
11 understand? 
12 A. No, that's what I was told by 
13 Mr. Rothwell and also by Mr. Jackson. 
14 Q. Who did Mr. Jackson tell you 
15 brought him in as a purchaser? 
16 A. He said he had been having 
17 discussions with Hank. 
n T T Q. And did you ever ask Mr. Jackson if 
19 he told other people that Mr. Sachs was going 
I 20 to get paid a finder's fee? 
21 A. Since he already told me that he 
! 22 wasn't entitled to one, why would I ask him 
!
 23 that question. 
I 24 Q. Did Mr. Jackson tell you that 
25 Mr. Sachs wasn't entitled to a finder's fee? 
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1 Lesser 
2 to one. You are not going to get paid a fee 
3 from us, and would you please stop bothering 
4 us. 
5 Q. When is the last time you talked to 
6 Mr. Jackson? 
7 A. Last time I think was when he 
8 signed the contract. 
9 Q. When did he sign the contract? 
10 A. In 2002,1 guess, something like 
11 that. 
12 Q. And you haven't spoken with him 
13 since then? 
14 A. I don't believe I have. 
15 Q. Do you recall seeing Ira Sachs at 
16 shareholder meetings? 
17 A. Yes, I do. 
18 Q. The annual meetings of United Park 
19 City Mines? 
20 A. Yes, I do. 
21 Q. So you were aware that he was a 
22 shareholder in the company? 
23 A. No, I wasn't aware of that. I 
24 assume that since he was there he owned 
25 shares. 
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1 Lesser 
2 A. He told him that, yes. 
3 Q. What did he say about it? 
4 A. He said he wasn't entitled to it. 
5 That he was introduced to the company by Hank 
6 Rothwell, who is the chief executive officer. 
7 I think Jackson told me that personally or by 
8 phone. 
9 Q. When did he tell you that? 
10 A. I don't remember. 
11 Q. Was it after this lawsuit was 
12 filed? 
13 A. No, I think it was before the 
14 lawsuit was filed, that's my recollection any 
15 way. 
16 Q. Well, when? 
17 A. I don't remember. 
18 Q. So you don't remember when it was 
19 but you are sure that it was before the 
120 lawsuit was filed? 
21 A. Yes, I think so, because with all 
22 the calls that everybody was getting from 
I 23 Mr. Sachs, including calls to my office. And 
I 24 frankly, then I got on the phone directly 
25 with Ira and I said Ira, you are not entitled 
1 
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24 
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Lesser 
Q. Isn't it true that during your 
lunch-in with Mr. Sachs you never told him 
that Gerry Jackson was already engaged in a 
deal with Mr. Rothwell or had talked to 
Mr. Rothwell about purchasing the Park City 
Mines? 
A I don't recall everything that was 
discussed, but I'm almost certain I never 
said that. 
Q. Do you recall? 
I don't recall. 
Is it possible that you did say 
A 
a 
that? 
A 
Q. 
It's possible* but I doubt it 
Did you ever meet Gerry Jackson 
prior to the time that he made the offer for 
the Park City Mines with his Capital Growth 
people? 
A I don't recall ever meeting him 
before that. 
Q. Or talking to him? 
A Or talking to him other than I 
think the conversation where we had I'm not 
sure whether — conversation or it was a 
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